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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

LAYTON CITY,
Plaintiff-Respondent

Case No. 16659

vs.
FERRIN DOUGLAS GLINES,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Ferrin Douglas Glines, was convicted before
the Circuit Court of the State of Utah, in and for Layton, Utah,
of the crime of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, in
violation of Section 41-6-44, Layton Municipal Code.

Upon appeal

to the Second Judicial District Court, that judgment of conviction
was upheld by the Honorable J. Duffy Palmer, Judge, Presiding.
From that judgment of conviction, the defendant brought a direct
appeal pursuant to the terms and provisions of Article VIII, Section
9, of the Constitution of the State of Utah solely and expressly to
test the Constitutional validity and construction of Layton
~unic1pal

Code 41-6-44.
-1-
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

The trial court found the defendant guilty of the crime o:
Driving under the influence of alcohol, in violation of Layton
Municipal Code, Section 41-6-44.

Subsequently, the trial court

sentenced appellant to serve a term of six months in the Davis
County Jail.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appellant seeks reversal of the verdict and judgment of th:
trial court upon grounds that Section 41-6-44, Layton Municipa:
Code is invalid.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Respondent, Layton City, concurs with Appellant's Statemen:
of Facts.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

REPEAL OF SECTION 41-6-43, u.c.A. (1953)
DID NOT INVALIDATE SECTION 41-6-44 OF THE
LAYTON MUNICIPAL CODE.

A.

Layton City enacted Section 41-6-44, pursuant

state statutes.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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t~

Respondent agrees with Appellant that Section 41-6-43
was repealed by the Utah State Legislature, but Section 41-6-44
of the Revised Ordinances of Layton City under which the Defendant
was charged and convicted was not enacted solely upon the authority
of Section 41-6-43.

The position of Respondent is that Section

41-6-44 was enacted pursuant to authority granted under various
state statutes including Section 10-8-84, U.C.A., (1953), which
provides the following:
They may pass all ordinances and rules and
make all regulations, not repugnant to law,
necessary for carrying into effect or discharging
all powers and duties conferred by this chapter,
and such are necessary and proper to provide for
the safety and preserve the health, and promote
the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and
good order, comfort and convenience of the city
and the inhabitants thereof, and for the
protection of property therein; and may enforce
obedience to such ordinances with such fines
or penalties as they may deem proper; provided,
that the punishment of any offense shall be by
fine in any sum less than $300 or by imprisonment not to exceed six months, or by both such
fine and imprisonment.
In addition, it should be noted that Section 41-6-16,
U.C.A., (1953), at the beginning of the traffic code states:
The provisions of this act shall be applicable
and uniform throughout this state and in all
political subdivisions and municipalities therein
and no local authority shall ena~t or enforc~ ~ny
rule or regulation in conflict with. the prov~sions
of this act unless expressly authorized herei~.
Local authorities may, however, adopt regula~i?ns
consistent with this act, and addi~ional tra~fic
regulations which are not in conflict therewith.
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"'1

Therefore, the repeal of Section 41-6-43 does not
affect municipal power to adopt an ordinance contain 1·ng 1anguag1
substantially similar to Sections 41-6-44 and 41-6-45, as
Section 41-6-16 specifically enables municipalities to adopt
and enforce rules and regulations consistent with Chapter 6 of
Title 41, Utah Code Annotated and "additional traffic regulatio~
not in conflict therewith."
Additionally, Section 10-3-710, U.C.A., (1953)
Sup. 1977) provides that municipalities may adopt provisions of
state law by reference.

Section 10-1-103, U.C.A., (1953) (Sup.

1977) provides:

The powers herein delegated to any municipality
shall be liberally construed to permit the municip·
ality to exercise the powers granted by this act
except in cases clearly contrary to the intent of
the law.
Also, Section 10-8-11, U.C.A. (1953), specifically
authorizes cities to "regulate the use of streets" and Section
10-8-30, U.C.A.

(1953), authorizes cities to "regulate the

movement of traffic on the streets."

Section 10-8-47, U.C.A.,

(1953), provides that cities may prevent 1 intoxication.

Thus, Section 41-6-43, U.C.A., (1953), was not the
only state statute from which the Respondent derived authority
to enact its ordinance prohibiting driving while under the
influence of intoxicating 1 iquor.

There is value in general

·
grants of aut h or1ty
an d unt1· 1 sue h general grants are limited

-4-
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by other state statutes, as in the Speth case, then the general
grant of authority is valid and cities can pass ordinances
under that general umbrella of authority.
Appellant argues that once a specific power statute
has been enacted which limits the authority given by a general
power statute and that specific authority has been repealed,
"one cannot resurrect it under the guise of general authority."
Respondent does not agree.

The purpose of a specific statute

may be to limit the authority which exists from the general
statute.

But, once this limitation is removed, all the power

and authority which originally existed under the general statute
returns.

B.

Legislative intent in repealing Section 41-6-43 was to

clarify the language and not to deprive cities of their right
to regulate driving under the influence and reckless driving.
The legislative counsel and legislative analyst to the
Transportation Subcommittee have advised the Utah League of Cities
and Towns' legal counsel that it was the legislative intent in
repealing Section 41-6-43 to remove from the Utah Code language
which was inconsistent and in conflict with Sections 41-6-44 and
41-6-45, i.e., Section 41-6-44 relating to driving under the
influence of alcohol or of any drug, and Section 41-6-45 relating
to reckless driving, used language to describe drunken driving
and reckless driving other than that used in Section 41-6-43.
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The explanation for the difference in language is that Section
41-6-43 was enacted in 1941 and had not been amended.

Sectio~.

41-6-44 and 41-6-45 have been amended several times and refleC'
both court interpretations of those sections and the more rece:
scientific descriptions of the offenses.

It was not the inten:

of the legislature to remove the authority, just the inconsist,
language.

This is evidenced by the re-enactment of Section

41-6-43 in the next legislative session.

C.

The court should not construe a general recodificatioi

in the same light as a specific repealing statute.
The inclination of the courts in the past has been nr·
to use the same rules of construction for recodifications u
for specific repealers, i.e., the general repeal should not
invalidate the general enabling legislation of Section 41-6-10
where the repealer was part of a 37 page "recodification." Th;
focus of the legislature was not concentrated on the repeal~
Section 41-6-43, U.C.A., (1953) alone which substantiates
Respondents argument that the loss of Section 41-6-43 was more
cosmetic, for consistency in language.

POINT II
CITIES MAY ENACT DRIVING UNDER THE
INFLUENCE ORDINANCES PURSUANT TO A
GENERAL GRANT OF AUTHORITY.

- 6-
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A.

Salt Lake City v. Kusse is controlling case law.
In Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 97 Utah 113, 93 P. 2d 671,

(1938), the defendant had been convicted of driving under the
influence of an intoxicating liquor pursuant to a city ordinance
which was identical with the state statute with minor changes
to conform that statute to the form of a city ordinance.

The

defendant challenged the city's power under its general power
to pass an ordinance prohibiting driving while under the influence
of intoxicating liquor and on the theory that a state law preempts a local ordinance on the same subject.
The Supreme Court of Utah held in the Kusse Case that
the grant of general police power to cities under the former
equivalent statute to Section 10-8-84, U.C.A., (1953), being
Section 15-8-84, R.S.U., (1933), authorized the city to pass an
ordinance to prevent driving while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor.

The basis for the authority was "the public

health, safety, morals, and welfare" authority of Section 15-8-84,
R.S.U., (1933), which is the same as our present Section
10-8-84, U.C.A., (1953).
In Kusse, the Court raised a question which it never
had to answer and which could be raised again here:
There may be some question whether Secti?n
15-8-30 does not pertain only to the regulation
of the actual movement of traffic and the actual
prevention of racing and immoderate driving; th~t
is, whether the section permits only the operation

-7-
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on these acts as they occur without giving power
to prevent an act or a condition which itself F
permitted, might affect the movement of traffic ·
or be likely to result in racing or immoderate
driving. While this seems a narrow construction
it need not now be decided .... (97 Utah at 116). '
The section before the Court in Kusse concerned the power of
municipalities to regulate the movement of traffic.

The que;:

was whether a driving under the influence ordinance was
regulating the movement of traffic or regulating behavior wt.::
could effect traffic.

And, if it was not directly a regulat;:

on the movement of traffic, could the ordinance still be

jw~

under that section because the behavior prohibited could e£fe:'
traffic?

The Court never reached those questions because the

found authority for the ordinance under the general grant of
authority, Section 15-8-84, R.S.U., (1933).
Kusse is still valid law and reasoning supporting::
proposition that a municipality has authority pursuant to a
general power statute to enact an ordinance~ prohibiting spec::
behavior.

Appellant's cites are thus inapplicable to our fac:

circumstances because this Court has already decided the is;~:
in Kusse.

B.

The Attorney General has issued an opinion suppo~

Respondent's position that cities have power to enact a d_ti.S;
under the influence ordinance.

-8-
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..\ppendix "A" is an opinion from the Attorney General's
Office of

th~

State of Utah dated June 7, 1978, which supports

Respondent's position that a general grant of authority exists
enabling cities to enact ordinances prohibiting driving while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor without the use of
Section 41-6-43, U.C.A., (1953).

C.

The Speth Case is not controlling case law.
In Speth, the Supreme Court ruled the state statute

in question limited cities by its specific working.

In our

case, in brief, no similar statute of specific wording existed
at the time of the Appellant's offense.

Section 10-8-84 and

others which were, and still are in existence, are statutes
of general grants of authority.
Thus, Respondent was not going beyond the limits of
a specific statute because there was none.

Instead, Respondent's

ordinance was pursuant to authority which it derived under the
state statutes cited in Point One above.

The issues are not the

same as in Speth.

POINT III
THE SECOND ALLRED DECISION SHOWS THE STATE
HAS NOT PRE-EMPTED THE FIELD IN RELATION
TO THE OFFENSE OF DRIVING UNDER THE
INFLUENCE.
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Appellant cites the first decision by the Utah Supre
Court in Salt Lake City v. Allred, 19 Utah 2d 254, 430 P. ZdJ
(1967), but that case was reheard by the Court to reconsi~r
their opinion based on the pre-emption theory.

The second

Allred decision, found in 20 Utah 2d 298, 437 P. 2d 434, (19o!
reversed the Court's first decision.

In the second decisiMt

Court said:
It is a well established principle in
this state that the city has the right to
legislate on the same subject as a state
statute where either the general police
power or express grant of authority is
conferred upon the municipalities. (Listed
citations omitted.) (437 P. 2d at 436).
The real significance of the second Allred decision
as it pertains to Appellant's argument that by allowing the
offense of "D. U. I." to be punished as a Class "A "misdemeanor
in certain instances shows the legislature intended to pre·emr
the field is found on pages 301 and 302 under head notes 6 ani
7 as follows:
As to whether or not the difference of
penalties between city ordinances and state
statutes on the same subject creates an
inconsistency that will invalidate the
ordinance receives our next consideration
and causes some difficulty. The previous
decision in this case stated as follows:

-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"It.must be conceded that the legislature
did not_i~tend to gra~t to cities the authority
to prohibit acts as misdemeanors which the State
has denounced as felonies."
It is statedin 37 AmJur., Municipal
Corporations, Section 165, P. 791, as follows:
"A municipal ordinance is not in conflict
with a statute authorizing its adoption
because of a difference in penalties.
Thus, further and additional penalties
may be imposed by statute, without
creating inconsistency and conversely,
at least in some instances lesser
penalties may b~ imposed by the ordinance
for violation than by the statute without
conflict."
See also annotation, 138 A.L.R. 1208,
1213. Mc uillin Munici al Cor orations,
Section 1 .1 , ootnote 71, cites cases
where it is held that ordinance is valid
when it relates to same subject matter as
state law where the ordinance prescribed
a smaller penalty. In these cases both
ordinance and statute are misdemeanors.
Although we do not believe there is
anything inherently wrong in allowing a
local government to punish conduct
amounting to a felony under state law
by a municipal ordinance which is only
a misdemeanor, nevertheless we do not
have to decide this question since the
case here involved, under subsection
7 and 8 of the city ordinance, does not
amount to a felony under any of the state
statutes pertaining to sexual offenses.
The elements involved in the present
ordinance case would not be of the same
as under the statute, or if any of the
elements were the same or common to both,
the statute in a felony case would require
proof of additional elements; therefore a

-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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claim of double jeopardy would not be valid
Double jeopardy contemplates all the elements
of an entire offense. See State v. Thatcher.
108 Utah 63, 157 P. 2d 258. We conclude that
the difference in enalties does not create
an inconsistenc t at will inval1 ate t e
or inance where t ere can e no valid claim
of double Jeopardy.
(Emphasis added.)
Respondent agrees with this Court and believes
re-enactment of 41-6-43 by the State Legislature further

t~

s~r

the Allred reasoning by showing that the legislature intended
to allow cities to enact "D.U.I." ordinances even though they
are limited to a Class "B" misdemeanor level of punishment.
In a prior decision, Salt LakeCity v. Kusse, 97 Uta'
113, 93 P. 2d 673, with respect to the pre-emption question,'.
court held: "An ordinance dealing with the same subject as a
statute is invalid only if prohibited by the statute or ~~~
therewith." (93 P. 2d at 673.)

And in answering whether the

ordinance was "prohibited by the statute or inconsistent ther:
the court cited Section 57-7-6, Revised Statutes of Utah 19ii
the proposition that nothing in the then state traffic code e:
prohibits cities from passing ordinances directed against ~r
driving.

Section 57-7-6 provided in part:
Local authorities, except as expressly
authorized, shall have no power or authority
to alter any of the regulations declared in
this chapter, or to enact or enforce any
other rule or regulations contrary to the
provisions of this chapter ..... .

-12-
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Compared to former Section 57-7-6, our present
Section 41-6-16, U.C.A., (1953), is express and clear enabling
legislation authorizing cities to prohibit driving under the
influence of alcohol or intoxicants and to punish reckless
driving.

CONCLUSION

Respondent had authority, under several state statutes, to
pass an ordinance controlling driving while under the influence
of intoxicating liquor.

The enactment of Section 41-6-43 just

put statutory language to the power cities already had as the
Kusse case showed.

The repeal of Section 41-6-43 only eliminated

the language but not the authority.

Cities went back to where

they were before Section 41-6-43 was enacted and drew their power
from the general state statutes.
Further, the re-enactment of Section 41-6-43 at the next
session following its repeal, along with the reasoning of the
second Allred decision, clearly shows the legislature did not
wish to pre-empt the field.

Therefore, Respondent urges this

Court to uphold the verdict and judgment of the Trial and

-13-
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Appellate Courts and rule that Layton Municipal Code Section
41-6-44 is valid.

;"~»c. BRUCE BARTON
Attorney for Respondent
437 N. Wasatch Drive
Layton, Utah 84041

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that the foregoing Brief of

Respon~m

was duly served on counsel for the Appellant, TOM JONES,
211 East 300 South, Suite 219, Salt LakeCity, Utah 84111, by

hand delivering two (2) copies thereof this

~;/~day of

December, 1979.
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UoncHT

n. IL\..XSE~

ATTO~NEY GENERAL.

STATE OF "l7TAH
STATE CAPITOL

~IxcuAEL I~. DE.\..:'n.::u

SALT L..AKE. CITY 64114

t801l 533-5261

DEPUTY ATIORN EY GENERAL

June 7, 1978
Mr. B. H. Harris
Cache County Attorney
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah 84321
Re:

78-173

Dear Mr. Harris:
In response to your letter of June 2, 1978, we have found
that H.B. No. 18 of the 1978 Budget Session did in fact repeal Section
Notwithstanding this repealer,
41-6-43, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
1·1e are of the opinion that city attorneys still have authority to
prosecute the driving under the influence of alcohol cases and other
offenses involving traffic if the ordinances are identical to or
consistent with state statutes. We can find no legislative intent
in the revision of many portions of the traffic code to restrict
municipal pO\vers 1-ihich have been deemed necessary since statehood.
Section 10-8-30, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, (enacted in 1898)
is still in effect and has not been repealed in our opinion. As this
section is construed by Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 97 U.133, 93 P.2d 671,
it is clear that the grant of power by tt:e state to municipalities has
and does include the pol'ler to regulate traffic by ordinance notwithstanding the adoption of statutes on the same subject. The limitation,
referred to in the preceeding paragraph is that the ordinance must be
consistent 1·1ith the statutory plan or plans for regulation, and for
example, could not provide greater penalties than those set out by
statute.
The cities may of course prosecute violations of valid
ordinances.
Very truly yours,

JPM:hk
Cc: F. L. Gunnell
171 East lst North
Logan, Utah
Mr. Phil Palmer
City Prosecutor
~·1etropol itan Hall of Justice

JOSEPH P. McCARTHY
Assistant Attorney General
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